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Toward a Model of Innovation and Performance 
Along the Lines of Knight, Keynes, Hayek and M. Polanyi 
Edmund S. Phelps* 
Capitalist systems are private-ownership systems distinguished by openness to 
implementing new commercial ideas - ideas for new products and methods - and 
by decentralized, pluralistic mechanisms for selecting the ideas to finance and 
providing the needed capital and incentives. The economic system in the U.S. is 
broadly of that type. The sort of system in continental western Europe is so 
constrained by institutions and regulations intended for the protection of 
stakeholders and “social partners” that it goes by other names - corporatism or the 
social market economy. China’s system must be called “state capitalism” because 
its financial sector is state-run. How these three systems affect innovation and 
economic performance is a topic of lively discussion today. 
To many proponents - Schumpeter, for example - and critics - Marx, for one 
- capitalism’s strength is its dynamism - the readiness and adeptness with which it 
moves forward. No doubt this dynamism derives in part from the creativity of 
business people and the acuity of the financiers judging which entrepreneurial 
ideas to back.1 Yet our understanding of the mechanisms and economic institutions 
involved, and why capitalism’s dynamism is apparently hard to match, has not 
advanced far since the seminal insights of the early modern theorists of capitalism 
- notably Knight, Hayek and M. Polanyi. 
I first review their legacy, which is not widely known. I then sketch elements 
of a model building on their insights, examine some of its implications and discuss 
recent and postwar experience from its perspective. 
1. The Beginnings of Capitalism Theory 
A student relying on secondary sources might surmise that the theory of 
capitalism’s dynamism originates in the classical case for competitive markets - a 
case first made by Adam Smith two centuries ago. This classical thesis was that 
the presence of many buyers and sellers competing with one another in the 
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marketplace caused wasteful resource allocations to be weeded out “as if by an 
invisible hand.”2 Under equilibrium conditions, efficiency in production prevailed. 
(One person’s choice could be expanded only at the expense of another’s.) This 
valuable feature of unimpeded markets, even if not fully realized, could not be 
matched by a government bureau: there were just too many goods and factors for a 
central planner to cope with. The point was made against communism by both 
“market socialism” theorists and capitalism theorist in the Interwar years of the 
20th century.3 
Going farther, Ludwig von Mises, another of the early moderns (and also a 
champion of capitalism), argued in the early 1920s that market socialism, a new 
system then beginning to be envisioned, would also fail to match the efficiency of 
market economies under private ownership. If managers did not receive the profit 
and bear the risks of their decisions, the resource allocations of socialist 
competition would be highly inefficient - an argument that effectively founded 
property-rights theory.4 
However, Mises’s theoretical argument that competition with private 
ownership delivered greater economic efficiency than state-run competition would 
did not imply that the former competition also delivered greater dynamism - or 
indeed any dynamism. It was left open whether competition among firms suffices 
to generate dynamism without private owners. And whether private ownership 
suffices for dynamism without competition. 
It might be thought that the theory of capitalism’s dynamism originates in 
the pioneering work on economic advances by the German School led by Arthur 
Spiethoff and Gustav Cassel in the first decade of the 20th century. Thanks to them, 
economic advances became a leading object of research for decades to come. Their 
work linked innovations to forces taken to be exogenous to the market economy, 
such as technological breakthroughs and the opening up of overseas markets and 
materials.5 A new discovery created new outlets for investment. The investments 
made “express the zeal of employers to profit by meeting the increased demand of 
the community for fixed capital.”6 This provided a useful view of some historically 
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important innovations - those sparked by technological shocks outside markets.7 
Their work was not fundamentally about capitalism, however. Although 
their analysis ran in terms of a competitive economy with unfettered firms, they 
did not imply that economic systems of the capitalist kind were better at seizing 
the investment opportunities presented. Indeed, they may not have believed that 
the selection of economic institutions - among capitalist ones or among a broader 
set with socialist or corporatist ones - was important for the response of economies 
to new exogenous opportunities. Furthermore, their model did not provide an 
economics of innovations in normal times, when new commercial ideas are not 
sparked by the latest technological development but simply draw upon a vast stock 
of technologies inherited over centuries. 
Comparative evidence on dynamism. Empirically, the kind of economic system in 
place does appear to make a difference for dynamism. A few central European 
economies twice became laboratories in recent decades for testing competition 
without private ownership. From the late 1960s to the late 1980s they allowed each 
state-owned firm to set its own prices, outputs, wages and workforce in 
competition with the others. Whether or not efficiency improved, it was clear that 
economic dynamism did not ensue. It was said in defense of these state firms that 
their managers’ plans for them were often blocked by the state and the managers 
knew they would not be fired for not innovating nor rewarded for innovating so 
they did not need to. In the 1990s, the state firms were put on their own. This time, 
with their backs to the wall, they began innovating like mad, hoping that with luck 
it would be their ticket to survival. But these state firms were not able to innovate 
profitably.8 Competition, it appears, is not sufficient for economic dynamism. 
Private ownership is necessary (and maybe much more than that). 
Recent evidence on corporatist systems, where ownership is private but 
capital is not very free (entrepreneurs are fettered, financing is distorted, the state 
is freely interventionist, and more) is also quite negative. The corporatist 
economies of continental western Europe, which by copying new methods and 
products overseas posted outsize productivity growth from the mid-1950s even to 
the early 1990s, thus largely catching up to U.S. productivity in the process, 
remained impassive when visions of the internet revolution caused entrepreneurs 
and financiers in the U.S., U.K., Canada - but nowhere in continental Europe - to 
bolt out the starting gate in the last half of the 1990s.9 The corporatist economies of 
east Asia, which achieved wonders as long as there was a wide gap between them 
and the West, ran into trouble in 1997 when state intervention in their corporate 
sector through permissions, subsidies and guarantees led to mass overinvestment 
                                            
7 Phelps and Gylfi Zoega build on Cassel in ‘Structural booms,’ Economic Policy, 32, April 2001. 
8 Roman Frydman, Marek Hessel and Andrzej Rapaczynski, “Why Ownership Matters: Entrepreneurship and 
the Restructuring of Enterprises in Central Europe,” mimeo., February 2000. 
9 See Edmund Phelps, ‘Europe’s stony soil for the seeds of growth,’ Financial Times, 9 August 2000. See 
also sections 1 and 5 of Phelps and Gylfi Zoega, ‘Structural booms,’ Economic Policy, 32, April 2001. 
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and insolvency.10 On this thesis, private ownership is not sufficient for dynamism 
either: Capitalism, in which capital is free to go in new directions without a green 
light from the state, the community and power blocs, becomes necessary at some 
point in a country’s economic development if dynamism is to emerge. 
Schumpeter’s extensions of the classical model 
Joseph Schumpeter in his groundbreaking book, first published in 1911, sketched a 
model of economic change through innovations internal to the markets of 
capitalist economies:11 An innovation was a new commercial development, a “new 
combinations of productive means,” and not to be confused with past inventions 
and discoveries by scientists and engineers, which were economically barren until 
subsequent innovations made application of them. Implementation of an 
innovative project might or might not require hiring scientists or engineers.12 
These innovations typically arose from perceptions of unexploited business 
opportunities on the part of business people drawing on their observation of 
commercial and industrial practice. This view was all the more natural because 
Schumpeter’s innovations included not only new production methods but also new 
steps on which recent scientific advances might have little to contribute - new 
goods for consumers, new markets and new business organizations. 
In Schumpeter’s system, implementation and development for the market 
of such an innovation required an “entrepreneur” with the “will” to undertake the 
venture13 - generally in “new firms.” The impression given is that an innovation 
may have to wait for an entrepreneur who is in the right place with the needed time 
and the right stuff. If the stock of innovations made possible by science is 
advancing without bound, “best practice” methods might forever lag behind the 
best possible methods.14 A decline of entrepreneurs or of their entrepreneurship 
would slow the rate at which innovations were proposed or deemed suitable for 
backing with new capital. In this system, bankers selected the investment projects 
to back. Finally, the successful start-ups stimulated other entrepreneurs to imitate 
and together they caused “creative destruction” of some existing products and jobs 
in the process of creating new ones. 
                                            
10 This is the hypothesis in Phelps, “Lessons from the Corporatist Crisis in Some Asian Nations,” Journal of 
Policy Modeling, March 1999. 
11 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (Vienna, 1911; Leipzig, 1912). English 
trans. from 1926 edn. by Redvers Opie, Theory of Economic Development, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass., 1934, quotation p. 66. By Schumpeter’s “model” I mean the stylized relationships and 
behavior he emphasizes and not the occasional concessions to reality that he makes. 
12 “[Although entrepreneurs may be inventors just as they may be capitalists, they are inventors not by nature 
of their function but by coincidence and vice versa.. .[Thus] the innovations which it is the function of 
entrepreneurs to carry out need not necessarily be any inventions at all.” p. 89. 
13 “The individuals whose function it is to carry out [new combinations] we call ‘entrepreneurs’.” (p. 74.) 
The French term entrepreneur, meaning undertaker of a project, was first used in economics by Richard 
Cantillon and made familiar by Jean Baptiste Say. John Stuart Mill imported it into English and Marshall 
broadened it to include managers. Schumpeter followed Say. The reference to “new firms” p. 66. 
14   Schumpeter notes the implication that “.the ‘best method’ of producing...is to be conceived as the ‘most 
advantageous among the methods which have been empirically tested and become familiar.’ But it is not the 
‘best’ of the methods possible at the time.” (p. 83, italics added). 
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This Darwinesque model of chance mutation and extinction was widely 
taught and Schumpeter became justly renowned for it. Though many went on 
viewing entrepreneurship as the earlier Germans did - as merely the unfailing 
market reactions to new exogenous inventions - Schumpeter had directed a 
powerful spotlight on the distinct role of entrepreneurs’ innovations and the 
challenge of their peculiar task: 
[The] economic leadership [of innovators] must...be distinguished from 
‘invention.’ As long as they are not carried into practice, inventions are 
economically irrelevant. And to carry any improvement into effect is a task 
entirely different from the inventing of it, and a task, moreover, requiring 
entirely different kinds of aptitudes.15 
[E]very step outside the boundary of routine has difficulties and has a new 
element.. .[0]utside accustomed channels, the individual is without those 
data for his decisions and those rules of conduct which are usually very 
accurately known to him.. .[The entrepreneur] must really to some extent do 
what tradition does for him in everyday life, viz., consciously plan his 
conduct in every particular.16 
Schumpeter thus created new concepts - a gap between “best practice” and 
perceptions of the “best possible;” innovations, the successful ones of which 
chip away at closing that gap; and the Schumpeterian entrepreneur, who in 
deciding on an innovation to undertake plays a role in determining the path of 
productivity and its industrial directions. 
Yet the mechanisms with which he closed his model - how he modeled the 
emergence of entrepreneurs, the nature of their projected enterprises and the 
award of funds to submitted projects - are strikingly pre-modern. He supposed 
that bankers can discern the worth of the projects submitted, just as they would 
do in the transparency of the classical economy. Implicitly, the ones getting 
funding are bankable propositions and those unfunded are not. 
It is important for the functioning of the system that the banker should know, 
and be able to judge, what his credit is used for and that he should be an 
independent agent...[T]he banker must know not only what the transaction is 
which he is asked to finance and how it is likely to turn out, but he must also 
know the customer, his business and even his private habits, and get, by 
frequently “talking things over with him,” a clear picture of his situation.. 
,[I]f banks finance innovation, all this becomes immeasurably more 
important. 
It has been denied that such knowledge is possible. The reply is that all 
banks who at all answer to type, have it and act upon it. The giant banking 
concerns of England have their organs or subsidiaries which enable them to 
carry on that old tradition: the necessity of looking after customers and 
constantly feeling their pulse is one of the reasons for the division of labor 
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between the big banks and the discount houses in the London money market. 
However, this is not only high skilled work, proficiency in which cannot be 
acquired in any school except that of experience, but also work which 
requires intellectual and moral qualities not present in all people who take to 
the banking profession.17 
Thus the Schumpeterian banker, although exposed to irreducible random 
influences that may affect an individual project, is safe from the unanticipated 
consequences that would tend to occur if there was an appreciable degree of 
“unmeasurable uncertainty” even about whole classes of projects. In this respect, 
Schumpeter’s mechanism is not consonant with subsequent understanding that the 
finance decision with regard to highly novel kinds of projects is problematic and 
with the perception that financial institutions may undersupply such projects in 
favor of some others offering greater “visibility.” 
Schumpeter’s very concept of an innovation is different from that of the 
theorists in the interwar period. He acknowledges that the entrepreneur’s plan “is 
open.. .to other kinds of errors than those occurring in customary action,” 
presumably errors regarding the costs of design and launch, production cost and 
user demand.18 Yet there is no suggestion that entrepreneurs might be misguided 
as a group. (Some interpreters of Schumpeter’s system even liken his 
entrepreneurs to people who stumble on five dollar bills on the street.) Moreover, 
though Schumpeter introduced “innovations” and linked them to people in 
business, the Schumpeterian entrepreneur seems to be a vessel for acting on 
information about unexploited opportunities detected and talked about by members 
of the business community, not generally by the entrepreneur himself. 
It is no part of the [entrepreneur’s] function to ‘find’ or to ‘create’ new 
possibilities. They are always present, abundantly accumulated by all sorts 
of people. Often they are generally known and being discussed by scientific 
or literary writers. In other cases, there is nothing to discover about them 
because they are quite obvious .It is, therefore, more by will than by intellect 
that the leaders fulfill their function, more by ‘authority,’ ‘personal weight,’ 
and so forth than by original ideas.19 (italics added) 
                                            
17 Schumpeter, Business Cycles: A Theoretical and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process, New York, 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1939. Quotation from the abridged 1964 edn., pp. 90-91. I cannot find any 
passage on loan decisions in the 1934 English translation of the 1926 edition. And if Schumpeter during the 
writing had already viewed bankers as an independent factor, that role would surely have been made explicit 
in the 1911 book. So it appears that Schumpeter tied up the loose end of finance only decades later. 
18 P. 85. 
19  P. 88. Elaborating on why entrepreneurship is scarce, Schumpeter says that “nobody may be in a position to 
do it...[I]t is this ‘doing the thing,’ without which possibilities are dead, of which the leader’s function 
consists. [Even in] a casual emergency, most or all people may see it, yet they want someone [else] to speak 
out, to lead and to organize.” (p. 88) “The entrepreneurial kind of leader-ship.. .is colored by the conditions 
peculiar to it. It has none of that glamour which characterizes other kinds of leadership, it appeals [only in rare 
cases] to the imagination of the public.. .its success [depends on] a certain narrowness which seizes the 
immediate chance and nothing else .[and] full appreciation of the service rendered takes a specialist’s 
knowledge of the case. Add to this the precariousness of the posi-tion.. .and the fact that when his economic 
success raises him socially he has no cultural tradition or attitude to fall back on but moves about in society as 
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The early moderns emerging a decade later differed radically on the essential 
nature of innovations - and blurring the sharp distinction Schumpeter had drawn 
between innovation and invention. 
The early moderns’ understanding of capitalism and its dynamism 
Conceiving the nature of entrepreneurs’ activity was the grand project of Frank 
Knight and, later, Friedrich Hayek. As is well-known, it was Knight who in his 1921 
book elaborated the distinction between two kinds of risk. there is measurable risk, 
which is insurable by purchasing an insurance contract from a diversified insurer, 
and there is what he called uncertainty, which he refers to as “indeterminate, 
unmeasurable.” The latter, usually called Knightian uncertainty, insurers will not 
touch, since, absent an intensive investigation such as a financier might make, they 
have no way of typing and calibrating it, so the risk is unknown. The occurrence of a 
pure profit or pure loss is attributed to Knightian uncertainty, which lies behind the 
difference “between actual competition and perfect competition.”20 Without that, all 
income of an enterprise, net of depreciation and any charge for managerial services 
by the owners, would be essentially interest income. Mere “change” is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for (pure) profit or loss.21 
Knight’s principal thesis was that, at least in capitalist economies, which are 
the object of his discussion, the prospects lying ahead for every business decision, 
including decisions to produce more or less of existing goods, involve elements in 
the calculation of demand and cost that are not known, not even statistically. Since 
entrepreneurs starting up a new project must consider far-future projects they 
especially face Knightian uncertainty.  
The universal form of conscious behavior is thus action designed to change 
a future situation inferred from a present one. It involves perception and a 
two-fold inference. We must infer what the future situation would have been 
without our interference, and what change will be wrought by our action. 
Fortunately or unfortunately, none of these processes is infallible, or indeed 
ever accurate and complete. We do not perceive the present as it is and in its 
totality, nor do we infer the future from the present with any high degree of 
dependability, nor yet do we accurately know the consequences of our own 
actions.22 
At the bottom of the uncertainty problem in economics is the forward 
looking character of the economic process itself. Goods are produced to 
satisfy wants; the production of goods requires time, and two elements of 
uncertainty are introduced…First, the end of productive operations must be 
estimated from the beginning. It is notoriously impossible to tell accurately 
                                                                                                                        
an upstart, whose ways are readily laughed at. (p. 89-90).” (Later he explains that the interest rate test serves 
to constrain the rate of innovation to  
the supply of available saving or what is left after rival sorts of investment have claimed their share.) 
20 Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, New York, Houghton Mifflin, 1921. See 19-20. Nowadays 
“risk” is apt to designate the first kind of “uncertainty,” which is opposite to Knight’s terminology. 
21 Ibid., 35-38. 
22 Ibid., 201-202. 
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when entering upon productive activity what will be its results in physical 
terms, what quantities and qualities of goods will result from the expenditure 
of given resources. Second, the wants which the goods are to satisfy are also, 
of course, in the future to the same extent, and their prediction involves 
uncertainty in the same way.23 
The general cause of the uncertainty - the reason why past experience is not 
sufficient to estimate at all closely the probabilities of the possible future returns 
on the project - is the endless heterogeneity of past data. 
The liability of opinion or estimate to error must be radically distinguished 
from probability or chance... for there is no possibility of forming in any way 
groups of instances of sufficient homogeneity to make possible a 
quantitative determination of true probability. Business situations, for 
example, deal with situations which are far too unique, generally speaking, 
for any sort of statistical tabulation to have any value for guidance. The 
conception of an objectively measurable probability or chance is simply 
inapplicable.24 
Knight in an insightful discussion argues that the “producer” rather than 
the consumer bears the uncertainty. 
[T]he consumer does not even contract for his goods in advance, generally 
speaking. A part of the reason might be the consumer’s uncertainty as to his 
ability to pay at the end of the period…[but] the main reason is that he does 
not know what he will want, and how much, and how badly; consequently 
he leaves it to producers to create goods and hold them ready for his decision 
when the time comes…[A]n outsider [such as a producer] can foresee the 
wants of a multitude with more ease than and accuracy than an individual 
can attain with respect to his own. This phenomenon gives us the most 
fundamental feature of the economic system, production for a market.25 
Some people are better at making entrepreneurial judgments or have more 
confidence in their judgments or positively like to work on “original” projects and 
seem “to prefer rather than shun uncertainty.” (p. 242.) These people typically bear 
the uncertainty. 
In [a handicraft] system every individual would be an independent 
producer…[But it] passes over into a system of “free enterprise” which we 
find dominant today. The difference between free enterprise and mere 
production for a market [is]…specialization of uncertainty-bearing. [The 
anticipation of wants and control of production with reference to the future], 
already removed from the consumer himself, is further taken out of the hands 
of the great mass of producers as well and placed in charge of a limited class 
of “entrepreneurs” or “business men.” 26 
Finally, investors and lenders helping to finance a new project have the possibility 
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of spreading the uncertainty by diversifying their investments and loans over 
several or many producers. 
The minute divisibility of ownership and ease of transfer of shares enables an 
investor to distribute his holdings over a large number of enterprises…[T]he 
losses and gains in different corporations must tend to cancel out in large 
measure and provide a higher degree of regularity and predictability in his 
total returns. And.. .the chance of loss of a small fraction of his total resources 
is of less moment even proportionally than a chance of losing a larger part.27 
Today, it might be commented, “structured,” or “layered,” contracts carve out 
pieces of the project - both equity and debt instruments - that specialized financial 
entities such as hedge funds and pension funds find well suited to their needs. 
Moreover, the start-up entrepreneur stands to lose his equity stake and his control 
of the enterprise if targets set by the investors and lenders are not met. So, as in 
Knight’s day, entrepreneurs must bear plenty of uncertainty. 
Thus Knight’s Risk gives a deep analysis of the radical uncertainty that is a 
distinctive, pervasive and central feature of capitalist economies. But although his 
portrait of capitalism may be logically complete, it leaves out something too big to 
be a telling likeness of capitalism. Innovation - therefore creativity in business, the 
novelty possessed by many new proposals, the asymmetry of information about 
them, and the expansion of knowledge that may result - never comes to have a 
central place in Knight’s model of capitalist economies. In a passage late in the 
book he takes up - generally from the view of its relation to uncertainty - the 
presence of (new) knowledge, “or what may be designated by the term ‘invention’ 
in the broad sense” (p. 339). He acknowledges that there is “discovery” and there 
is “creation” (p. 340) - the latter a “result of deliberate thought, investigation and 
experiment” (p. 341). But this fleeting allusion to knowledge formation was too 
thin and too late to have an impact on thinking about innovation.28 
John Maynard Keynes entered the stage about the same time as Knight and 
some of his enduring insights complemented those of Knight. Keynes’s book on 
probability theory was aimed at understanding decisions under unmeasurable 
uncertainty.29 His contribution was to show that a rational response to such 
uncertainty was to behave as if the probabilities of the explicit possibilities 
summed to a number less than one, thus leaving room for the sense that there were 
contingencies not identified or not fully appreciated. His recognition of the 
uncertainty that faces entrepreneurial projects was to carry over to the 
                                            
27  Ibid. 254. 
28 Where Knight says that “some individuals want to be sure.. .while others like to work on original 
hypotheses” (p. 242) he means for all we know that some business people prefer to manage, say, an existing 
power company, with all the uncertainties it may hold in store, while others would prefer the uncertainties of 
starting up a new power company. The “original” project may mean nothing more than trying the ith project 
that some concept suggests would find a profitable market after the previous i - 1 projects based on the same 
project have succeeded. 
29 Keynes, A Treatise on Probability. London, Macmillan, 1921. 
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macroeconomics of capitalist economies that he started in the mid-1930s.30 His 
famous allusion to “animal spirits,” a term of Plato’s, behind businessmen’s 
investment decision-making served to underline his view that the volume and 
directions of entrepreneurial projects and of investment projects in general 
depended heavily on the entrepreneur’s instinctive feeling about what the future 
would hold for the project, not just on financial and engineering data. Finally, it 
was Keynes who first emphasized that, in an entrepreneurial economy at any rate, 
the uncertainty of the future inevitably leads to diversity of opinion about where 
prices might go and where profits might lie; yet rules of thumb may prevail in 
some markets, making prices there quite sluggish until one or more developments 
make some things clearer - and, possibly, a new rule of thumb begins to form.31 
Incidentally, though it is a long story, it is fair to say that, in an age - the 
1920s - when Lenin was constructing a communist economy in Russia and 
Mussolini a corporatist one in Italy, Keynes stayed on the side of capitalism.32 He 
opposed laissez-faire (the “free market” in English), believing that the state has 
useful functions to play, had a low regard for wealth accumulation and a distaste 
for money grubbing. But for him these were not essentials of capitalism. Certainly 
he saw the depression that struck Britain and the U.S. in the interwar period as 
signaling a serious lapse in capitalism’s performance and he tried hard erge He 
thought that capitalism remained valuable as an engine for generating commercial 
innovation and thus raising productivity. Capitalism will survive in a country as 
long as people’s ideas of a good economy allow it. “The world,” he said in answer 
Marx, “is ruled by ideas and little else.”33 
Hayek comes in where Knight and Keynes leave off. Hayek, beginning in the 
second half of the 1930s, emphasized the untried and thus the speculative nature of 
what the entrepreneur with a new project is attempting, introduced in the 
mid-1930s a distinction between two kinds of knowledge.34 In the classical view, 
knowledge is unambiguous and complete, so its implications are fully 
determinable. There is no sense of knowing there are things we do not know, 
things we may come to know eventually and things we will never know. In the 
modern view adopted by Hayek, actors in the world have to make judgments that 
are not fully implied by their formal models. As Keynes wrote, “It is necessary 
finally to act.” And that requires them to draw upon their tacit, or personal, 
knowledge: “We know more than we can say,” in the aphorism of Michael 
Polanyi. In the growth-of-knowledge theory of Hayek and Polanyi, formal 
knowledge advances in the sciences as scientists combine their current tacit 
                                            
30 Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. London, Macmillan, 1936. 
31 Keynes, “The General Theory of Employment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 51, February, 1937. 
32 To digress more, in the late 1930s he objected to the expense of Beveridge’s plan for a welfare state and in 
the 1940s he teased Hayek for extolling individualism while proposing state healthcare and other activities. 
33 Keynes, The General Theory. 
34 Hayek, Collectivist Economic Planning, London: George Routledge, 1935, and Hayek, Individualism and 
Economic Order, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1948. 
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knowledge with existing formal knowledge in conceiving and selecting hypotheses 
to test and experiments to make.35 That is how formal knowledge advances. 
Hayek then applied this growth-in-knowledge theory to the activities of 
innovation and discovery in capitalist economies. The entrepreneurs come to their 
distinctive judgments through their distinctive personal experience and resulting 
personal knowledge, or “know-how” in his terminology. Similarly, the technical 
work in engineering and marketing a new products or methods involves personal 
knowledge. “[M]uch of the knowledge that is actually utilized is by no means ‘in 
existence’ in [a] ready-made form. Most of it consists in a technique of thought 
which enables the individual to find new solutions.”36 Thus capitalist economies 
generally draw on a diversity of tacit knowledge that in the aggregate is vastly 
more than any one banker or shareowner or central planner could possibly possess 
or even conceive of. (Hayek held that since innovations entail creative leaps and 
invariably these leaps involve tacit knowledge, which is outside recognized 
knowledge and hence goes beyond what can be communicated in explicit terms, a 
state investment bank would not be well-suited to select among entrepreneurs’ 
projects: Being accountable to the central government for its mistakes, it would 
avoid all the very innovative proposals because of the ambiguity of the evidence 
for them and the consequent impossibility of communicating their appeal to higher 
authorities or to the public.) 
It follows that the many lenders and investors selecting among 
entrepreneurs’ projects in a capitalist economy are also, like the entrepreneurs, not 
immediately able to grasp the worth of every entrepreneurial project offered for 
financing. Thus financiers must also depend in part on their intuition, deciding to 
take or not to take an initial and limited chance on an applicant in spite of the 
ambiguity of the evidence. If the typical innovative project is in part inherently not 
capable of being articulated, how successful the bankers and venture capitalists 
prove to be in selecting among them hinges not only on the partial and tentative 
understanding they initially acquire about the entrepreneurial projects submitted to 
them but ultimately also on the willingness of the entrepreneur to enter into a 
provisional relationship with the entrepreneur that provides the entrepreneur with 
some leeway to experiment and prove himself and thus the financier to acquire 
more knowledge about the project. This is a far cry from Schumpeter’s “bankable 
propositions.” 
It further follows that the success of an innovation remains a matter of 
considerable uncertainty until it is determined by the reception it finds among 
                                            
35 Three classic references are Friedrich A. Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” American Economic 
Review, 35, 519-530, 1945; Hayek, “Competition as a Discovery Procedure (1968),” New Studies in 
Philosophy, Economics and the History of Ideas, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1978; and Michael 
Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1962. 
36 Hayek, “Socialist Calculation II: the State of the Debate,” in Collectivist Economic Planning, London: 
George Routledge, 1935, reprnt., Individualism and Economic Order, op. cit., p. 155. 
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potential users in the marketplace. As Hayek must have enjoyed commenting, the 
strength of the demand for the novels of C. P. Snow could not be known 
beforehand, not even by the author himself, until they were produced and offered 
to the book-buying public.37 Every innovation is like a scientific experiment in 
which, characteristically, the probabilities of the various results are not 
determinable beforehand - nor fully determinable afterwards either. 
The potential users themselves may have little idea how much they will like 
the new product or method unless and until they try it. (Users cannot plausibly be 
assumed to know that a priori if, as Hayek supposed, the entrepreneur, who is an 
expert and himself a consumer, does not know he has anticipated all the things that 
might deny him success.) Thus households and firms deciding on a new product or 
method have the same knowledge problem as do the entrepreneur and financier 
behind the product or method. Economies of dynamism are shot through with 
Hayekian knowledge formation. 
One other point. If the individual upstart entrepreneur is central to 
innovation, how can we resolve the puzzle that would have troubled Mises: Large 
firms are bureaucratic and, especially in the U.S., typically owned by passive 
shareowners so they do not usually have a principal lender or core investor who 
could choose in-house “intrapreneurs” to back and advise on their innovative 
projects. Yet the large firms account for the lion’s share of the industrial research 
and seemingly of innovation as well. The resolution may be that the new and 
successful ideas of the start-up entrepreneurs owe most of their further 
development and possible extensions to high-capital-cost projects at the large 
firms - including the large firms that the start-up firms sometimes grow to be and 
the large firms that buy up successful start-up firms. If the germinal material for 
innovation by large firms is the underdeveloped innovations of recent start-ups, 
models of large-firm innovation based on the “defensive innovation” of the 1942 
Schumpeter, “work” only thanks to the stimulus of the 1911 Schumpeterian 
start-ups. The interplay between the small-firm sector and the large-firm sector 
perhaps overcomes the bureaucratic organization of the large corporations, 
especially public companies. 
Knight’s recognition of the uncertainty surrounding business decisions and 
Hayek’s bottom-up theory of discovery and growth of knowledge have ramified 
over a wide range of subjects and influenced many economists and political 
scientists, including Jane Jacobs, Milton Friedman, Michael Oakeshot and James 
C. Scott.38 Yet the conceptual advances of Hayek, Knight and Keynes on 
                                            
37 Hayek, “The Non Sequitur of the ‘Dependence Effect’,” Southern Economic Journal, April 1961, repmt. 
Phelps, ed., Private Wants and Public Needs, New York, W. W. Norton and Co., 1962. 
38 Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, New York, Vintage Books, 1961; Milton 
Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962; Michael Oakeshot, 
Rationalism in Politics, New York, Basic Books, 1962; and James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State, New Haven, 
Yale University Press, 1998. (Referring to medical practice, Friedman wrote “...[A] faith healer may be just a 
quack who is imposing himself on credulous patients, but maybe one in a thousand or in many thousands will 
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innovation and dynamism are little imbedded into formal models and thus into 
orthodox theory. No doubt further effort is needed. 
This survey virtually stops here not on any perception that no further core 
developments in the subject occurred in the second half of the 20th century (other 
than Hayek’s last writings) but because an adequate review would involve a much 
larger cast of contributors - and much less radical contributions - than are found in 
the interwar period. Yet I can refer readers to the seminal, contributions that stand 
out in my mind among an undoubtedly larger number that would deserve equal 
mention. There is the contribution by Schumpeter in the war-time and early 
postwar years in which he argued that oligopolists are motivated to engage in 
defensive innovate in order to avoid losing the profits they already have from their 
market share, a thesis recently taken up by William Baumol.39 Another is the work 
by Richard Nelson and Thomas Marschak arguing that financiers can largely meet 
the problem of having far from complete knowledge about one or more key parts 
of an entrepreneurial project by entering into an agreement that metes out the 
finance sequentially upon the entrepreneur’s meeting successive benchmarks.40 
The Nelson-Phelps model has reverberated in recent years not only for its 
much-tested implications about the role of education but also because it implies 
that entrepreneurs will be reluctant to develop and market an innovation in a 
market where few potential adopters are highly educated.41 Another salient 
contribution is the work by Amar Bhide in which it is argued that small firms have 
a distinctive role in innovation owing to their advantage in coping with Knightian 
uncertainty and large firms have a distinctive role in innovation owing to their 
advantage in managing and financing projects with high capital costs.42 A 
significant portion of the economics we have to date about evolving economies is 
presented in the book by Nelson and Winter.43 There is also the work of recent 
years by Roman Frydman and Michael Goldberg developing an economics 
applicable to an economy where there is inherently imperfect knowledge about its 
current structure and how it unfolds over time.44 Finally my recent work argues 
that economics has failed to take into account the benefits of economic dynamism 
in modeling and evaluating capitalism: The philosophy called “vitalism” implies 
                                                                                                                        
produce an important improvement in medicine. The effect of restricting the practice of what is called 
medicine...is certain to reduce the amount of experimentation that goes on and hence to reduce the rate of 
growth of knowledge in the area.” p. 157.) 
39 Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1942; 2nd enlarged 
edn. 1947. See also William J. Baumol, The Free-Market Innovation Machine: Analyzing the Growth Miracle 
of Capitalism, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2002. 
40 Richard Nelson and Thomas Marschak, “Flexibility, Uncertainty and Economic Theory,” 
Metroeconomica, 1962. Of course, the financiers may nevertheless have to choose their entrepreneurs in the 
dark to start with and that may deter a large quantity of finance. 
41 Richard R. Nelson and Edmund S. Phelps, “Investment in Humans, Technological Diffusion and 
Economic Growth,” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, May 1966. 
42 Amar V. Bhide, The Origin and Evolution of New Businesses, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000. 
43 Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Cambridge, Mass., 
Harvard University Press, 1982. 
44 Roman Frydman and Michael Goldberg, Imperfect Knowledge Economics, forthcoming, Princeton 
University Press, 2007. 
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that the processes of problem-solving and discovery are an end, or reward, in 
themselves, not just a means; high productivity derives much of its social utility by 
enabling more people to afford taking jobs that are rewarding in those 
non-pecuniary ways.45 
2. A Rudimentary Framework for Theoretical Study of Innovation 
I want to sketch here the core element of a model capturing the essential aspects of 
a capitalist economy in the sense of an economy driven by proposals of private 
business participants to private financiers for backing of innovative projects. The 
first objective is to construct in broad outline a micro-founded model of the 
mechanism governing what we might call the “flow-supply” of new ideas to the 
innovation market coming from entrepreneurs and the “flow-demand” from 
financiers. The subsequent objective is to consider, albeit somewhat informally in 
the present paper, how certain market forces that would otherwise not be present - 
such as the circumstances and expectations of entrepreneurs and those of 
financiers - affect the outcome of their interaction. It will be a source of 
satisfaction to have market models of the supply of entrepreneurial ideas to the 
market and their selection, or demand, by financiers, since innovative ideas are 
central to business life in a capitalist economy. Furthermore, having such a 
component in our larger model of the economy may help us organize hypotheses 
about how an economy’s performance is impacted by the institutions and other 
conditions impacting on some of the central figures generating (or failing to 
generate) dynamism - the entrepreneurs and the financiers. We have to study the 
entrepreneur as a micro actor and to study the entrepreneurial economy as an 
interactive system involving entrepreneurs and financiers. (This first pass, though, 
avoids the richness of institutions found in real capitalist economies.) 
The construct of an “innovation fair” 
The classic supply-and-demand apparatus does not apply to the core market of 
capitalist economies - the capital market, particularly the market for capital going 
to entrepreneurs’ innovative projects. The least of the complications is that every 
entrepreneurial project is a different good, just as every new house placed on the 
market differs from the others. That each entrepreneur’s idea is idiosyncratic, 
hence unique, does not by itself preclude a manageable model of equilibrium. 
Let me in the interest of simplicity introduce a construction that reflects the 
fact that an economy is spread out over space, so the economy’s actors are not 
ordinarily in contact with large numbers of others, yet they can convene with 
others intermittently for purposes of important transactions. I will suppose that 
periodically - once every 5 years, for example - all the entrepreneurs who in the 
previous period have hit upon a new idea they regard as worth the trip travel to a 
                                            
45  “The Economic Performance of Nations: Prosperity Depends on Dynamism, Dynamism on Institutions,” in 
E. Sheshinsky et al. (eds), The Growth Mechanism of Free Enterprise Economies, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 2006. 
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sort of fair to seek financing. A comparable number of financiers, each with a 
large pool of liquid capital, attend the fair to seek entrepreneurial projects to invest 
in or make loans to. They are the abstract counterparts of today’s hedge funds and 
venture capital funds.46 (I was delighted to learn about a year ago that such fairs 
actually take place! The entrepreneurs reportedly remain stationary while a 
procession of the financiers circulates around them.) Once they contract to finance 
a project they will act as partners of the entrepreneur, drawing on their generally 
different experience to solve problems in the development and launch of the new 
product or method. With the project’s completion the financiers will sell their 
shares in an IPO on the stock exchange and their bonds on debt markets. 
It might be thought that the capital-market model devised by Irving Fisher 
and James Tobin, originally applied to many heterogeneous investment projects, 
could be a satisfactory tool to analyze this innovations market.47 Whether applied 
to investment projects or to innovation projects, that model implicitly supposed 
that there is no ambiguity about the promise of each such project. As a result there 
is agreement among the financiers about the value of each project: it is the present 
value of the agreed expectations of the stream of future gross earnings it would 
generate. The investment cost of each project is also a given. It then followed, as 
Tobin showed, that the capital market would rank highest for financing the 
project(s) with the highest calculated value per dollar of investment cost; would 
rank second-highest the project(s) with the next highest ratio of value to cost; and 
so forth until there were no more projects with a positive rent - with a value-to-cost 
ratio (Tobin’s Q ratio) greater than one. An inframarginal entrepreneur collects 
from his financier(s) a rent that, added to the above investment cost, leaves her 
(the financier) with the same zero expected profit on that investment as would be 
expected on the marginal project. 
I would comment that such a Fisher-Tobin equilibrium may exist even if the 
profitability of each project is subject to exogenous sources of uncertainty (i.e., 
Knightian uncertainty in which no one knows the probabilities of all the various 
conceived outcomes or even knows all of the possible outcomes there are). An 
unambiguous ranking of projects would still exist if some war of unknown 
probability would be expected by all, should it occur, to reduce the value of all 
projects in equal proportion; in that case the ranking would not even be affected 
(though fewer projects might make the cut). More generally, a ranking would still 
exist if it is understood that exogenous shocks of unknown probability would 
impact unequally on the values of the various projects, provided the financiers are 
alike in their judgment of those impacts and the weight they give to the shock and 
their judgment of those impacts and the weight they give to the shock. 
But complications set in once we recognize, following Hayek and Polanyi, 
                                            
46 A hedge fund marks to market its assets, so its investors have an idea of the price they could expect for 
their shares if they decide to leave the fund. Investors in a venture capital fund are more nearly locked in. 
47 I. Fisher, [to be supplied], and J. Tobin [to be supplied]. 
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that the entrepreneur’s idea presents some ambiguity-. The entrepreneurs are to 
some extent like the fighter pilots: unable to explain the thinking behind their 
decisions.48 So, in any brief initial interview, the financiers can see only dimly 
what each idea is, what would be involved to implement it, and what the selling 
points and the snags might be if it were marketed. Moreover, since financiers 
weighing projects have to use their own limited experience and specialized 
knowledge, and these differ from financier to financier, the financiers do not all 
make the same valuations. Hence, even if each financier falls into a group of 
like-minded financiers each of whom views the entrepreneurs’ proposals the same 
way, one such group might rank the projects differently from another. So if we are 
to build a usable model of the intersection of the entrepreneurs’ projects and the 
financiers’ capital it is necessary to see whether disagreements in financiers’ 
rankings are apt to be a barrier to the conclusions we might hope to reach. 
To narrow down possibilities I propose to give the model more structure by 
supposing that each financier prefers to back the idea of an entrepreneur whose 
“model” is most resonant with his own - his thinking with regard to which industry 
is the best bet, swinging for the fences or not, and so forth.49 So the “capital 
market” is a sort of matching process that matches a financier to an entrepreneur 
who the former sees as having a model compatible with his own model. Thus 
capitalism is a system producing a profusion of ideas representable as competing 
models of the economy (or a piece of it) and when an entrepreneur and financier 
sense they have roughly the same model they band together in a bet on its ability 
to prove itself. In this way the financiers are matched to the entrepreneurial 
projects to which their collaboration can contribute the most in view of their nearly 
identical outlook. 
After the entrepreneurs have had their initial interviews, some of them will 
generally enter into a further discussion and that may lead to a letter of intent, 
called in the trade a terms sheet, from a financier (and her possible partners). The 
penalty for withdrawing from such a commitment makes it quite unlikely that the 
financier will fail to sign the indicated contract and choose instead to send a new 
letter of intent to another entrepreneur. Entrepreneurs who do not receive or do not 
accept such letters leave the game, their project having failed to gain finance. 
 
Equilibrium and disequilibrium in the innovation market 
To discuss forces acting on equilibrium and departures from equilibrium we need 
to define it. As I customarily do, I will use the expectational definition of market 
                                            
48 The post-Polanyi literature includes Hubert Dreyfus, What Computers Still Can’t Do (Cambridge, Mass., 
MIT Press, rev., 1979) and Gary Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions (Cambridge, Mass., 
MIT Press, 1998). 
49 The Bradley brothers, two celebrated entrepreneurs in Minneapolis some decades ago, remarked on 
precisely this core aspect of entrepreneurship (without benefit of reading Hayek, so far as I know). “The 
entrepreneur,” they wrote, “invents a new model of the world from which he derives his new business 
project.” (Quoted by memory from documents ca. 1998.) 
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equilibrium, which was originated by Marshall and Myrdal. I use a macroesque 
version of this equilibrium, referring to representative agents. And I put 
intertemporal considerations aside, leaving intertemporal equilibrium as a separate 
concept. 
Such an equilibrium in the innovations market requires that the 
entrepreneurs as a whole are not overestimating the average value per investment 
dollar being placed on the projects of the other entrepreneurs, so the entrepreneurs 
are not being misled by such an expectational error into holding out for higher 
terms than they would otherwise do; similarly, the entrepreneurs as a whole are not 
underestimating the average value per investment dollar. This equilibrium also 
requires that the financiers as a whole are not overestimating the average value per 
investment dollar that the other financiers are offering, so the financiers are not 
being misled by such an expectational error into offering higher terms on the 
projects they want than they would otherwise do; similarly, the financiers are not 
generally underestimating the average value per investment dollar.50 Obviously the 
case of equilibrium case does not rule out that some entrepreneurs have been 
misled by his or her expectations about the outcomes on the market; it only 
specifies that the errors have roughly canceled out - that the representative 
entrepreneur has not overestimated the demand for his project by financiers. 
This expectational equilibrium does not imply market clearing. Indeed it is 
reasonable to suppose that, even if their market expectations (just discussed) were 
correct, some of those entrepreneurs were overly bullish about the appeal of their 
own project and some subset of these entrepreneurs finally found themselves 
having no more offers to agree to. Although they may have made successive 
inferences leading to successive reductions of their “acceptance price,” not all of 
them necessarily reduced their acceptance terms fast enough to avert the result that 
their projects are not under contract by the time all the financiers have committed 
all or nearly all their funds on other projects. (There is no “recontracting” here. 
The discussion after the initial interview that may lead to letters of intent may have 
high opportunity costs, so that penalties are provided for withdrawing from a 
commitment.) A rather different point is that an entrepreneur may be willing to 
gamble on holding out for a price above his reservation price, knowing that he is 
not facing perfectly elastic demand. (In reality, entrepreneurs can also wait for the 
next fair, which some do.) So our equilibrium is of the non-market-clearing kind, 
which is familiar in labor-market models. 
Another observation is that even if the innovation market finds equilibrium, 
it does not follow that this equilibrium is completely independent of which 
transactions happen to be made early as one project after another is adopted by 
financiers: path dependence is conceivable and no doubt possible. Owing to the 
                                            
50 The above requirements for equilibrium in the innovation market capture the spirit of the concept, even if it 
should be found that some further requirements are appropriate to add. 
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Hayek’s point that much of the entrepreneur’s understanding of his proposed 
innovation is personal knowledge, a financier will have far from complete 
knowledge about it and will have little idea of what any other person’s knowledge 
about it is. Thus there may be learning in this regard over the course of the 
market’s allocations of projects and the information on the terms at which they are 
sold. Further there may be some chance factors influencing whether or not some 
subset of projects are bought up early. So the future of the bidding may depend to 
some extent on which projects happen by chance to be sold early in the process. So 
the equilibrium in the market for these Hayekian objects may not be uniquely 
determined. However, the possibility that there is some indeterminacy around the 
equilibrium and maybe not pure white noise should not deter us from investigating 
the effects of forces acting on equilibrium and the effects of disequilibrium as long 
as the answers to the questions asked are not sensitive to the particulars of the 
equilibrium that is or would have been reached. 
What drives financiers to back any innovation at all? 
It is perfectly natural to wonder whether an equilibrium in this innovation market 
is necessarily one in which a positive number of projects win financing. Maybe it 
is only because entrepreneurs can finance themselves or they are friends or 
relatives of a financier that they can get their projects going. On this issue, I would 
argue that even in the case of perfect ignorance on the part of the financiers - so 
that financiers were unable to distinguish one entrepreneur’s project from another 
(and one entrepreneur’s character and talent from another’s) - financiers would 
generally supply some financing and some innovation will go ahead. My argument 
is this: If all the new projects offered looked the same to financiers, applications of 
pseudo-entrepreneurs would explode if Tobin’s Q ratio exceeded one or even 
equaled one, since a great many people would prefer being an entrepreneur to 
being a salaried employee - especially an entrepreneur paid an entrepreneur’s 
wage. So the expected Q ratio in every period would have to lie in a range below 
one. And if the entrepreneurs valued projects only for the positive rent they 
received from it - the rent consisting of the excess financiers pay over the 
investment cost (figured at market wage rates) - then none of the innovative 
projects would be undertaken. But if there are some entrepreneurs who estimate 
highly enough the non-pecuniary satisfactions that would accrue from doing their 
project (the thrill of it, the learning experience) and if these entrepreneurs would 
acordingly subsidize the project with a reduced salary in order to fill the gap 
between the investment cost (figured at normal salaries) and the deficient valuation 
put on their project by financiers, then they will be able start their projects. If the 
promise of entrepreneurs to work at subsidized wage rates out of professed love of 
their work looks to be incentive-incompatible (maybe the entrepreneur will restore 
his wage, causing the financier’s returns to suffer), the entrepreneur may be able to 
signal his love of the project by investing resources of his own or family members 
in spite of the less-than normal rate of return that is expected. (For what it is worth, 
James Tobin told me at Yale that Schumpeter believed that entrepreneurial 
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projects earned a below-normal rate of return. I have not found that in print 
though.) 
A more general point here is that in any case - the case of financiers’ perfect 
ignorance and the case of financiers’ initially imperfect knowledge - some portion 
of the entrepreneurial activity taking place is the result of the large concessions (in 
returns or leisure sacrificed) that some of them, whether or not all, make through 
their own labor or on their own capital investment in order to save the project and 
thus have its nonpecuniary satisfactions.51 If that is so, the supply side of 
entrepreneurial projects is more important than it is perhaps generally understood 
to be. The supply price (or reservation price in other terminology) at which he will 
supply the attention and concentration necessary for conceiving of the 
entrepreneurial idea will be lower the higher are those expectations. Moreover, 
once the project has been conceived, the acceptance price that the entrepreneur 
requires to let it go to the prospective financier (rather than hold off for a better 
offer) will also be lower the higher his expectations of the project’s nonpecuniary 
reward to him. The latter is in contrast to the “textbook” model: In the 
Fisher-Tobin model of investment, which can be applied in principle to investing 
in new products and methods, an entrepreneur with his already conceived project 
is activated, or deployed, by the financial sector if and only if its expectations of 
the value of the entrepreneur’s project exceeds the opportunity cost of the project; 
the entrepreneur’s expectations do not figure in. (That is, existing projects are 
supplied perfectly inelastically.) 
Comparative statics: expected reward, wealth, economic culture, institutions 
The perspective of the market model I have been using here suggests to me four 
exercises that may be useful to get a sense of how the “model” works. 
First, as implied in the just previous discussion, entrepreneurs ’ expectations of 
the nonpecuniary rewards from entrepreneurial labor and their expectations of the 
pecuniary rewards from their own capital investment in the project matter for the 
volume of entrepreneurial activity - that is, the volume of projects started - not just 
financiers’ expectations. My own macro models would then lead to the corollary 
that that the expectations of both actors matter for the determination of total 
business activity, as measured by total employment. To be definite, improved 
expectations of entrepreneurial job satisfaction would operate to increase the 
number of entrepreneurs supplied to the market (i.e. the fair). And the acceptance 
wage would presumably shift down. The “incidence” would include a reduced 
pecuniary wage and an increase volume of entrepreneuring. (I would note 
parenthetically that an optimal contract between entrepreneur and financier will 
reflect any difference of optimism between entrepreneur and financier. Standard 
contract theory implicitly posits that the parties to a contract share the identical 
                                            
51 Their overly enthusiastic forecasts of the rate of return on investments in the project will also tip them 
toward accepting worse terms from financiers to get the project over the top. 
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“rational expectations,” since they have the identical model of the world. Work in 
that vein does not fit in a theory of capitalist economies, in which views are never 
homogeneous and may be wildly diverse.) 
An increase in the expected pecuniary reward, which is the expected 
entrepreneur’s wage after any concessions made to obtain financing, is not exactly 
analogous to the an increase in the non-pecuniary reward. But an increase in 
pecuniary reward net of the concessions, meaning a decrease of the necessary 
concessions, is analogous. If the market for innovations becomes stronger, so that 
entrepreneurs need offer a smaller concession to draw financing, that would 
increase the number of entrepreneurs supplied. 
Second, the wealth of entrepreneurs and that of financiers also matter for the 
level of entrepreneurial activity and as a consequence for total business activity. If 
the size of the concessions that some or all entrepreneurs would be willing to make 
upon sensing that their project was turning out to be marginal are a “normal good,” 
so that a given entrepreneur would have a lower supply price (or reservation 
reward) the wealthier he is, an increase of his wealth operates to shift outward (and 
downward) the supply curve of entrepreneurs willing to develop projects at any 
given price or reward; on this account, taken alone, the increased wealth would 
expand the number of projects offered to the market and thus the number started 
up. On the other hand, greater wealth could have the opposite effect of reducing 
the zeal of the potential entrepreneur to gamble on coming up with a project 
bringing big nonpecuniary or pecuniary reward. Moreover, the same increase in 
wealth could shift up the acceptance price, since the wealthier entrepreneur can 
better afford to wait, which operates to contract the number of projects started up 
in our equilibrium model. So the end result of higher wealth among entrepreneurs 
is in doubt on two counts. But what is noteworthy is the implication that increased 
wealth could deter innovation by making potential entrepreneurs less keen and 
make those who do develop projects more choosy about the deal. 
An increase in the wealth of financiers or of the depositors who invest in the 
venture-capital and hedge funds run by the financiers may boost the demand for 
entrepreneurial projects, i.e., boost the supply of finance. My long-time 
collaborator Hian Teck Hoon points out that if the economy is coming off an 
innovation-based boom in which a generation of entrepreneurs have made a great 
deal of money, that may boost the supply of finance to the next generation of 
entrepreneurs. 
The modeling and the statistical investigation by Aghion, Howitt and 
associates proposes a somewhat similar yet distinct hypothesis: the credit 
worthiness, or credit line, that an entrepreneur has may be roughly proportional to 
the entrepreneur’s wealth. That mechanism leads the authors to the theoretical 
implication that increased wealth is positive for entrepreneurial development 
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activity and the resulting rate of innovation.52  The statistical findings in recent 
papers support their hypothesis. But it remains to be seen whether increased wealth 
in the wealthy economies promotes innovation. (But see discussion below 
involving incentive-type contracts.) In any case, the framework here by itself poses 
a potential conflict between wealth’s effect on the supply of projects, which is 
potentially negative, and its effects on the demand, which is presumably positive. 
Provisionally, I incline to see wealth in relation to wage rates as, on balance, a 
drag on entrepreneurial projects, especially start-up projects, in part because such a 
drag may be one of the few mechanism governing a country’s rate of innovation. 
A plausible hypothesis, for example, is that activity rates of all kinds, including 
rates of entrepreneurial activity, wane as wealth climbs relative to wage rates. 
Whether the U.S. record in the past half-dozen years is an important outlier for that 
hypothesis remains to be determined. 
Third, there is the implication that a country’s economic culture may 
play a part in the determination of the volume and quality of entrepreneurial 
activity. The inclination of would-be entrepreneurs to avoid 
nonentrepreneurial jobs in the production of already existing consumer goods 
in favor of entrepreneurial jobs in the development of new goods causes a 
contraction of the supply of consumer goods and an expansion of the supply 
of entrepreneurial projects (with corresponding effects on interest rates and 
wealth accumulation). Hence, it is not obviously bad economics to admit the 
possibility that some economies, for example those in western continental 
Europe, suffer low entrepreneurial activity not solely because of costly 
impediments to entry etc. or poor financial institutions but because they have 
a low level of “entrepreneurial spirit.” (The possibility this is so does not 
mean it is so, of course.) Furthermore, there is the possibility of variability 
through time in the strength of this spirit, even wide mood swings.53 
The “spirit” of financiers also comes in as an influence on the valuation 
that a financier puts on a potential entrepreneurial project. Here, of course, the 
financiers’ willingness to endure Knightian uncertainty is important. That 
does not mean, though, that low share prices, for example, are a sure sign of 
high aversion to uncertainty. The question is the demand price at some 
reference level of the innovation volume, possibly measured in persons 
engaged in innovational activity. One has to estimate and compare across 
countries the demand schedules for innovation. A low demand in the schedule 
sense may be the result of an culture hostile to innovation. Or it may instead 
be evidence of economic institutions adverse to innovation. 
                                            
52 See, for example, Philippe Aghion, Peter Howitt and David Mayer-Foulkes, “The Effect of Financial 
Development on Convergence [of the Productivity Growth Rate]: Theory and Evidence,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 120, February 2005, 173-223. 
53 An example is Martin Wiener, English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, Cambridge 
University Press, 1981. See too Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations, Yale University Press, 1982. 
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Last, the framework is compatible with influences from existing economic 
institutions. Obviously, hindrances to entrepreneurs will translate into lower 
forecasts of the profitability of available entrepreneurial projects and thus curtail 
the number of projects receiving finance. Institutional inefficiencies and 
deficiencies clearly also impact on the demand curve for innovations. 
The structuring of innovation finance 
I want to touch on another aspects of the interaction of partially ignorant financiers 
with entrepreneurs bearing new projects - the sort of contract between entrepreneur 
and financier that would create suitable incentives for the entrepreneur in the 
present context where the financier faces the ambiguity of what the entrepreneur is 
able and willing to explain. Would a suitable contract entail bond financing by the 
venture capitalist or other financier? Or, say, convertible preferred stock? Or what? 
Relatedly, do contracts that provide a suitable “incentive reward” have the effect 
that “incentive wages” have in the labor market - namely, to lead to better 
incentives though at the cost of creating an equilibrium at non-market-clearing 
terms? This is part of the ground being explored in work that Max Amarante and I 
are currently doing. 
Tentatively, it appears that neither complete reliance on convertible 
preferred stock nor complete reliance on debt finance nor on a combination of the 
two can perfectly align the interests of the entrepreneur and the financier. An 
optimal contract is not knowable in an exact way. But maybe the features 
possessed by an optimal contract, in very simple settings at any rate, could be 
deduced. 
It is also beginning to appear that, from the point of view of incentive theory, 
the lead financier can be expected to offer the entrepreneur incentive arrangements 
not offset by a compensated decrease of the entrepreneur’s salary. Can it be 
formally argued that financiers drive up the terms of the standard contract in an 
attempt to give the entrepreneur something to lose if his estimated efforts or 
acumen are found deficient, which makes financing more expensive than is 
portrayed in a neoclassical (Fisher-Tobin-type) theory, so that there will be fewer 
entrepreneurs financed per financier and in toto? The answer would seem to be 
yes, generally speaking, in so far as the incentive arrangements are a second-best 
deterrent to the entrepreneur’s self-dealing in ways that are difficult or impossible 
to “monitor” or detect.54 (But I would add that the presence of performance-related 
bonuses does not necessarily lead to a failure of the market for entrepreneurs to 
“clear,” just as the practice of paying according to output (“piecework”) does not 
lead to involuntary unemployment.) 
Regarding incentive-compatible contracts, it should be remarked that they 
                                            
54 There is an argument to that effect in Phelps, Political Economy: An Introductory Text, Norton, 1985. See 
also theoretical modeling to this end in work by Joseph Stiglitz. 
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create a channel through which the entrepreneur’s wealth works in the opposite 
way to what was suggested earlier: The wealthier the entrepreneur, the harder it is 
for financiers to motivate him to make a highly stressful level of effort and to 
incentivize him not to engage in self-dealing. This incentive consideration, taken 
alone, operates to make entrepreneurial activity decrease with increased wealth in 
the hands of entrepreneurs. A similar effect from an adverse economic culture 
could result. 
3. Economic Performance: the Role of Innovative Activity 
Two propositions appear to be implicit in most recent commentary and certainly in 
this conference. First, a sort of triad of features - an abundance of new 
entrepreneurial ideas, entrepreneurs capable (often in partnership with financiers) 
of providing suitable development of their ideas, and a pluralism of financiers with 
a background sufficient to make a good selection of ideas and entrepreneurs for 
backing - is central to innovation and thus to high economic performance. Second, 
that shortcomings or barriers in some or all of these respects lie at the heart of the 
unsatisfactory performance characteristics that the western Continent’s economies 
are widely inferred to have. I subscribe to both propositions. Yet we need to be 
clearer about what we mean by economic performance and why a country’s 
economy must be structured for innovative activity - particularly innovation by 
indigenous innovators - to be a high-performance economy. 
The extent of an economy’s performance capabilities and the 
satisfactoriness of an economy’s use of its capabilities are two quite separate 
concepts. A high-performance car may be used just to go down the street for 
groceries. Analogously, a high-performance economy may be largely devoted to - 
some might say wasted on - the provision of social insurance and social assistance; 
an economy may be a very poor performer yet an exemplar of free-market 
principles, including the austerity of its entitlement programs, if any. The 
distinction is between choosing a bad point on the frontier and having a bad 
frontier of points to choose among. 
The valuable capabilities that an economy may possess to one degree or 
another - the capabilities described by the economy’s frontier - are several, of 
course. In advanced economies, a good prospect of surviving long enough to have 
a meaningful life is obtainable at such a small cost that we can skip over that and 
go to the capabilities that are more costly - capabilities without which survival 
might not be valued much. Of huge importance, I believe, is the economy’s 
capability of providing people prospects of careers generating mental stimulation, 
intellectual challenge, problem-solving and maybe the exercise of creativity, thus 
prospects of personal development (self-realization) and various attainments 
(independence, recognition, and pride in earning one’s way). This philosophy of 
life, by the way, is sometimes called vitalism, which runs from Aristotle to 
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Cervantes to Wm. James and Henri Bergson.55 There are other capabilities, of 
course. The productivity with which labor and capital can produce is also an 
important capability even in an advanced economy. High productivity is to be 
preferred to lower productivity in part because increases in income have valuable 
uses but also because increases in the wage rate across the economy help workers 
to afford to opt for the more engaging and rewarding jobs. Another capability is 
the freedom and the means to find and take preferred employment opportunities, 
which translates into rights to enter, to be free of licenses and fees, to be permitted 
to hold property and accumulate wealth. Yet another capability is the degree of 
security from destitution, which involves the provision of private or social 
insurance arrangements. An increase in one capability would generally permit 
nationals through substitution to “take out” the gain in the form of enjoying more 
of every capability. But a capability might require some factor of production 
specific to that capability, so that the abundance of the other capabilities will not 
help in providing that capability. 
A thesis of mine is that if an economy’s capability in providing rewarding 
work is to go from some barely adequate level to a level out of which can come 
substantial personal development and attainment, the economy needs the 
dynamism to generate a sufficient flow of innovations. Further, a well-functioning 
capitalist system possesses the dynamism to generate adequate innovation: 
Capitalism’s dynamism - the abundance of the entrepreneurial ideas it stimulates, 
the diligence with which entrepreneurs are motivated to develop their idea, and the 
acumen of a pluralism of financiers in selecting the ideas for backing - generates 
successive entrepreneurial ideas that serve to provide mental stimulation in the 
workplace, to pose new problems to be solved, and thus to open the way to 
self-realization and gratification. (Of course, not every job can be exciting and 
fascinating, but virtually all jobs are more engaging and challenging in relatively 
capitalist economies than in the others - from the Continent’s corporatism to the 
earlier socialism of eastern Europe.) 
The vitalist quality of the workplace in a country and even the 
innovativeness of the economy creating it, if they are present, cannot be easily 
observed and measured. But various statistics can be interpreted as signs of the 
quality of business life: the labor force participation rates of men and of women, 
the quit rate of employees and the unemployment rate, the length of the workweek 
and number of vacation days, and the level of hourly productivity (adjusted where 
needed for low-skill person excluded from employment). Some other indicators 
may constitute circumstantial evidence of engaging and rewarding work or the 
dearth of it: a high saving rate, a low retirement age, and a relationship between 
employees and employers that seldom breaks out into open conflict. In short, 
                                            
55 “The Economic Performance of Nations: Prosperity Depends on Dynamism, Dynamism on Institutions,” in 
Eytan Sheshinski, ed., The Growth Mechanism of Free Enterprise Economies, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, forthcoming 2006. 
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ample vitalist rewards and challenges in the workplace and thus the dynamism that 
fuels them leave markers that add up to a visible sense of prosperity or 
flourishing56 
So my thesis leads me to interpret the data in western continental Europe - 
preponderantly high unemployment rates, low labor force participation rates, short 
workweeks, and somewhat low productivity relative to the U.S. (and some other 
comparators, including Ireland, Australia, U.K. and Canada) - as evidence of 
relatively poor economic performance in a fundamental dimension: an 
insufficiency of stimulation, engagement and intellectual challenge in the 
workplace. And, in my thesis, this deficiency can in turn be laid to an insufficiency 
of innovation. The latter also affects performance in another dimension: relative 
productivity. This interpretation of the Continent’s apparently unsatisfactory state 
requires defense, however. 
Proponents of the supply-side interpretation argue that it is the “excess 
burdens” of the welfare system on the Continent that largely accounts for its 
relatively low employment and the dearth of enterprising spirit among potential 
innovators. They blame the Continent’s increased unemployment and its failure 
fully to catch up on the ill-effects of the Continent’s social model, which expanded 
enormously in the 1970s and 1980s, rather than on the economic model - the 
economic system (institutions and culture) in the terminology here. By the late 
1980s Richard Layard and Stephen Nickell were contending that the increased 
unemployment rates were simply the result of huge replacement ratios that had 
come to be built into unemployment compensation programs. I myself showed in 
my 1994 book Structural Slumps that increases in the tax rate on labor, thus cuts in 
the after-tax real wage rate, had distributed-lag effects on the unemployment rate 
and in a 1997 paper found some evidence in U.S. times series for believing that the 
level of the welfare state might make a difference.57 58 But I subsequently noticed 
that some evidence brought up by Robert Mundell, in the form of a cross-section 
scatter diagram of the OECD economies, was pretty thin. A look at such data in 
1998 and a further analysis in 2004 made me skeptical that the welfare state was 
the main culprit in the low employment on the Continent.58 So for some years I 
have attributed the Continent’s poorly performing system far less to its social 
model than to its economic model.59 The near-stagnation striking several 
continental economies, one after the other, over the past ten years has only 
                                            
56 This was the main theme in Phelps, “The Continent’s High Unemployment: Possible Institutional Causes 
and Some Evidence.” Keynote Paper at the Conference on Unemployment in Europe, CESifo and Yrjo 
Jahnsson Foundation, Munich, December 6-7, 2002. Conference volume, MIT Press, forthcoming 2006. 
57 Edmund Phelps and Gylfi Zoega, “The Rise and Downward Trend of the Unemployment Rate in the 
U.S.,” American Economic Review, May 1997. 
58 Phelps and Zoega, ‘Natural-rate theory and OECD unemployment,’ Economic Journal May 1998 and 
“Searching for Routes to Better Economic Performance,” Forum, CESifo, March 2004. 
59 This thesis was first stated and developed to some extent in Phelps, Enterprise and Inclusion in Italy, 
Kluwer, 2002 and broadened somewhat to include economic culture in a keynote speech, “The Continent’s 
High Unemployment: Possible Institutional Causes and Some Evidence,” Conference on Unemployment in 
Europe, CESifo, Munich, December 2002. 
  
26 
strengthened my conviction. 
Some opposing the dynamism thesis say that the Continent’s economic 
performance is not inferior to that in the U.S. whether or not the Continent’s 
dynamism is less. They deny that a wide comparison of economic performance 
would favor the U.S. and they suggest that if dynamism should be found relatively 
deficient on the Continent, that would only show that dynamism is not very 
important for high performance. They point to particular uses of the economy to 
which they are partial, such as extensive provisions for protection of the 
environment and for the economic security of the poor and the aged. They also 
point to high levels of saving and wealth. But the perceptions, such as mine, of 
relatively poor economic performance on the Continent are focused on 
non-pecuniary rewards from jobs, employment, wages and productivity. And there 
cannot be much doubt that the Continent as a whole is inferior on that score to the 
50 states of the Union as a whole.60 
Some other opponents of the dynamism thesis say that the Continent’s 
dynamism is not inferior to that in the U.S. whether or not the Continent’s 
economic performance is poorer. They deny that the evidence over the sweep of 
history points to a deficiency of dynamism on the Continent. They point to the era 
previous to the Continent’s slump - the “glorious years” from the mid- 1950s to 
the mid-1970s - when West Germany and France, later Italy and some of the 
smaller economies, experienced a great spurt in productivity and an accompanying 
surge of employment, dubbed the “economic miracle.” But does that prove that the 
Continent’s economic system is dynamic now - no less than the U.S. system? Or 
dynamic then? 
In an opinion concurring with the dynamism thesis on its main point yet 
different from my formulation, the late Mancur Olson argued that the Continent 
was fairly dynamic then, thanks to the war, which wrested the economy from the 
paralyzing grip of entrenched monopolies and old wealth, and to such liberal 
reformers as Ludwig Erhard and Luigi Einaudi, who were favored over the 
postwar socialists and communists. In Olson’s view, though, the Continent 
gradually lost its dynamism in ensuing decades as powerful unions and 
monopolies retook power.61 I have to pass over his argument here. 
                                            
60 Those with long memories might observe that over the century as a whole Continental unemployment was 
not worse than in the U.S. It is a fact that in the 1930s, when depression tendencies were worldwide, the 
Continent did a better job at combating unemployment than the U.S. did. But the poorer record of the U.S. in 
that respect was almost certainly not inherent in the nature of the contrasts between the Continental and the 
U.S. economic systems. The U.S. could have greatly moderated the rise of unemployment through a monetary 
policy that avoided a deep deflation early in the decade and refrained from industrial policies that must have 
had a chilling effect on entrepreneurs’ spirits in the second half of the decade. Similarly, the Continent’s better 
record on unemployment appears also to have owed much to its more vigorous public works rather than any 
immunity of its economic system to double-digit unemployment rates. 
61 Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983. I do not recall 
seeing any suggestion in his later writing that there was or might have been a rebirth of dynamism later on. 
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I take the simpler position, of which Herbert Giersch was perhaps the 
leading forerunner. In my view, the Continental economies have never been 
dynamic - not since sometime in the 1920s. How then to reconcile the Continent’s 
rapid productivity growth with a dearth of dynamism? I argue that in the 
Continent’s glorious years the spurt of productivity and wages was fueled by the 
abundant stock of new methods and products overseas - mostly innovations made 
in the U.S.; once the war was over and the rails and bricks were put back together, 
the Continental economies with at least some amount of financial resources and 
some spread of university education could copy or adapt at little or no cost the 
U.S. goods and methods. Yet, as more and more of the low-hanging fruit was 
picked, the growth rate of Continental productivity was bound to slow more and 
more until it had sunk back to the growth rate in the U.S. . Moreover, the stock of 
private wealth, which had not kept up with wages when they were rising rapidly, 
grew to a normal level relative to wages once wages were again rising slowly, with 
the result that employees became more demanding and employer costs increased. 
Also, investing in training, marketing and plant had to be cut, with the result that 
many jobs were cut. Unemployment rates were forced up, leveling off only in the 
mid-1980s. Thus the Continental economies stood revealed as seriously lacking in 
dynamism after all. (They eked out some more productivity gains vis-à-vis the 
U.S. until the early 1990s, but the impression of a dearth of dynamism was largely 
confirmed.) 
This explanation does not persuade all economists. Many remember the 
glorious years as full of Continental innovation - endogenous, thus Schumpeterian, 
and indigenous, not borrowed innovation from overseas. Some recall the 
innovators who grew famous in Italy and France in the 1950s and 1960s, such as 
Dior, Gucci, de Laurentis, Pinin Farina and a few others. It seems to these 
observers that the Continental system must have been “dynamic,” otherwise these 
innovators would not have been on the stage; and if the institutions are much the 
same now, it is surely the case that the Continent still possesses dynamism: the 
premature halt to the productivity catch-up and the stubborn elevation of 
unemployment can only be the result of something else, such as a deterioration of 
economic prospects - demographic or technological. Yet this conventional 
impression is ripe for re-examination. First, it is striking that the great 
entrepreneurial figures just mentioned were nearly all confined to a handful of 
industries in what was a large and diversified economy, mainly design and cinema. 
And the successful innovations in the other industries during that period, like 
Chanel and Dassault, started up in the 1930s, so they do not bespeak of an 
Olsonian postwar dynamism.62 
Another reply I would make refers again to wealth levels. The wavelet of 
innovation peculiar to the glorious years was the result of a dearth of wealth in the 
1950s and the 1960s relative to wages, which spurred many entrepreneurs to 
                                            
62  See David. Jestaz, “Reflexions sur le modèle français.” ms., Alliance Program, Columbia, July 2005. 
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venture on new ways that might succeed in rebuilding their wealth, which a few 
managed to find. By the 1980s, when ample wealth-wage ratios were again 
widespread among Italians, Germans and the French, there were few 
entrepreneurial types hungry enough to want to battle the system for a place to try 
out their new idea; or they had come up with no idea, knowing how fruitless it 
would be to have a new commercial idea. In this argument of mine, more wealth 
meant fewer would-be entrepreneurs; that argument does not contradict the earlier 
hypothesis that more wealth also made each given entrepreneur more able to 
afford to make a concession to financiers in order to do the project he had set his 
sights on. Vastly more wealth across the population by the 1970s and 1980s meant 
that more young people entering university or the labor force aimed to be 
“entrepreneurs” in the political world, high society and the arts, where they would 
spend part of their wealth, not add appreciably to it by going into business. (In 
Thomas Mann’s Buddenbrooks, if I remember correctly, those inheriting a fortune 
from their father did not have the same drive nor the same gifts for business that 
their father had and went into other pursuits; and the grandchildren went still 
farther afield.) Although the managerial positions were undiminished and had to 
be filled somehow, often by reaching down to a lower economic or social status, 
the number of entrepreneurial positions simply shrank. Perhaps the influx into the 
United States of immigrants who, with wealth levels generally far below the 
national average, were eager to replenish the stock of entrepreneurs has given this 
country a huge advantage over the Continental nations, whose borders have been 
almost closed until relatively recently. 
Let me sum up my interpretation of the bearing of the Continental 
experience on the connection of performance, particularly the more vitalist 
elements of performance, to economic dynamism: The slowdown that developed 
on the Continent in the late 1970s was widely thought to be the initial descent 
toward a soft landing onto some path that be might be equivalent or superior to the 
path on which the more capitalist economies were following. But it was beginning 
to be apparent by the late 1980s that the Continent’s future was to run a steady 
second place behind the innovative pace setter - its workplace duller than the 
American, hence its labor force participation lower and unemployment higher, and 
its productivity level a respectful distance behind the U.S. level. As it turned out, 
the Continent’s catch-up with the U.S. in productivity terms came to an abrupt halt 
in the early 1990s, when U.S. productivity growth picked up - leaving hourly 
productivity noticeably lower than in the U.S. In the mid-1990s, unemployment 
rates were also generally higher on the Continent and labor force participation 
rates generally lower than in the U.S. and the U.K. 
It should not have been puzzling that this performance was lackluster. The 
relative performance of France, Germany and Italy in the previous normal period - 
the 1920s - was worse. Even in the abnormal period of the 1930s, the growth rate 
productivity in the U.S. continued its record-setting pace, which the Continental 
economies were unable to match. Evidently the “high years” of Continental 
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innovations that stretched into the first decade of the 20th century could not survive 
the changes to the economic system that came into place in the Interwar period and 
were largely retained and further articulated after World War II. Between one 
century and the next there was a system shift. 
Since the mid-1990s, an economic decline of sorts has set in as growth 
rates of hourly productivity dropped far below the U.S. rates: first the Netherlands 
in 1996, then Germany in 1998, next Spain in 1999 and then France and Italy in 
2001. Unemployment rates, which had fallen for a time in the 1990s, are generally 
up again (Italy and Spain excepted) in 2005 and higher than in 1995, while in the 
U.S. the reverse has happened. The premature end of the catch-up turned into a 
serious falling-back, which has still not come to a halt. 
The question is, then, what are the main sources of the poor performance 
characteristics and thus the relatively poor dynamism found in most if not all the 
Continental economies - compared to the U.S. and possibly other comparators? 
What I have come to in the past couple of years is a speculative hypothesis 
that, while still speculative, is more refined view than I held until a few years 
ago:63 It is very difficult to find a unique “smoking gun” in the form of some 
particularly deadly economic institution or subset of economic institutions - in 
corporate governance, in finance, in regulation and so forth - that could account for 
the relative dearth of dynamism on the Continent. Research aimed at weighing the 
total influence of those institutions must go on and I will be active in contributing 
to that. Yet we must widen our net. 
It is necessary, I believe, to give more weight to economic culture than I 
was prepared to do in previous years as recently as 2002 and 2003. The 
explanation modified thesis is that the Continent (and to some extent the U.K. too) 
is in the grip of a culture hostile to enterprise and innovation. But I will leave the 
development of these thoughts for another occasion. 
Concluding Remarks 
The ongoing research I have discussed is aimed at modeling capitalism along the 
modern (or modernist) lines proposed at various times by Knight, Keynes, Hayek 
and M. Polanyi - and inevitably Schumpeter, though many of his concepts 
remained unnaturally classical. In the modern theory, business participants hit 
upon new commercial ideas inspired in large part by their specialized knowledge 
and idiosyncratic experience. Those interested in becoming entrepreneurs 
implementing their idea must first invest the time required to prepare a case for 
presentation to potential financiers. At the innovation market, or “fair,” the 
entrepreneurs supplied to the market compete for an experienced financier to 
provide financing and advice on their project and the financiers try to match up 
                                            




with a likeminded entrepreneur through interviews and the offer of a contract. A 
match between entrepreneur and financier permits them to develop the 
entrepreneur’s new idea. If that development is successful, the innovation is 
launched and marketed in an attempt to win early acceptance and rapid spread of 
the new product or service or organization among potential users, either producers 
or consumers. An unsuccessful innovation is one that is shelved owing to 
insufficient prospects for demand, although the idea and its development will 
perhaps be retained for a time by some in the economy. A successful innovation is 
one that finds a demand among users sufficient to warrant putting the innovation 
into regular production. Through time, understanding of the attractions of the 
innovation may diffuse through the market, causing the demand to widen. Such an 
innovation may ultimately earn a pure profit, also known as an economic profit, or 
instead a pure loss, or economic loss. 
Thus capitalism is seen as a system for producing and using new ideas, and 
these ideas could in principle be represented as new models of the economy (or a 
piece of it). Some new models succeed in establishing themselves at least for a 
time while others fail. The innovation process thus produces an accumulation of 
models, which we could imagine reaching some steady-state level though the 
current extant models have the property that they have driven out previous models. 
One of the obstacles to a “model” of the capitalist system has been the difficulty of 
conceiving how financiers are able and willing to back entrepreneurial projects 
when, as is generally the case, these financiers can have little idea of what the true 
prospects of profitability are. In section 2 of this paper I provided a sketch of a 
model that offers a way out of that problem - whether or not it is the only way or 
the best way. 
There is the strong possibility that the current assortment of models being 
applied in the production sector is preferable to the previous assortment, given 
existing tastes and scientific knowledge. However, for active-age people in 
economically advanced countries it is the process - the stimulation, problem 
solving and personal development that comes out of the creation, development, 
marketing, pioneering use and learning experienced by those who are engaged in 
the production and use of the innovation - that may provide the greater part of the 
benefit to the economy’s participants. So the dynamism generated by the 
innovation process does not have to produce faster growth than produced by all 
fundamentally different systems for the innovations of a capitalist, thus an 
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